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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
RIGHT OF IEVISEE TO PROCEEDS OF FIRE
INSURANCE POLICY-LOSS OCCURRING
AFTER DEVISE
Where real estate is insured against loss by fire and,
after a contract for sale of the property is made, but before
the time fixed for performance, a loss by fire occurs,
there is a lack of uniformity in the decisions as to who is
entitled ultimately to the insurance money.1
The English view permits the vendor to collect the
proceeds of the policy, but subrogates the insurance com-
pany to the rights of the vendor against the vendee.2 This
conclusion places the entire burden on the vendee and is
objectionable because the risk which the insurance com-
pany contracted to assume and for which it has received
sufficient consideration is not borne by the insurance com-
pany but cast upon the vendee.
The Pennsylvania view, on the contrary, permits the
vendor to collect the insurance money, but designates him
as a trustee for the vendee.$ The theory is, that the vendor
who holds the legal title as trustee for the vendee until
the day of performance in order to secure performance,
holds the policy and the proceeds therefrom in the same
way.
Is it the law of Pennsylvania, when property is in-
sured and later devised but after the devise a loss occurs,
that the personal representative who collects the proceeds
holds it as a trustee for the devisee?
When a contract for the sale of real estate is made it
may be argued that it is inequitable to compel the vendee
to pay the full contract price and in return receive insured
property which has been damaged or destroyed by fire.
However, this argument is unavailable when there is a
devise of land because the devisee is a mere volunteer.
Under the standard policy of fire insurance, which runs
'A. J. White Hutton, Some Fire Insurance Problems, 25 Dick-
inson Law Review 255.
2 Castellain v. Preston, L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 380 (1883).
3Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863); Insurance Co. v. Updegraff,
21 Pa. 51) (1853).
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to the insured and his "legal representatives,"4 it is well
settled that the personal representative is the proper party
to maintain an action to recover for a loss occuring after
the death of the insured.' This result is sound because
policies of insurance against fire are personal contracts and
consequently the right of action arises in the personal rep-
resentative after the death of the insured. The fact that
the personal representative is specifically named in the con-
tract considerably strengthens the conclusion that he has
the right to maintain the action 6. Furthermore, it would be
illogical to say that a fire insurance policy is a personal
contract and then permit the heirs or devisees to sue on a
personal contract to which they were not parties.
Even the English courts which deprive a vendee of the
benefits of a fire insurance policy admit that a devisee is a
cestui que trust of such proceeds. In Parry v. Ashley,
T
the testator charged certain real estate with an annuity
and subject to that, devised it to the defendant who was
the sole residuary devisee and also the executrix. After
his death the executrix renewed the insurance policy on
the building which afterward burned. *The Court held, "the
proceeds of the policy cannot be considered as part of the
testator's personal estate but that they are affected with
a trust for the benefit of the parties interested in the real
estate."
The same rule has been enunciated in the United
States.8 Culbertson v. Cox9 is typical. The facts were as
'Act of 1921 P. L. 682, sec. 523, 40 P. S. 658.
5Wyman v. Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253 (1863); German Insurance Co.
v. Curran, 8 Kan. 9 (1871); Georgia Home Insurance Co. v. Kin-
niers Adm'x, 28 Grat. (Va.) 88; Forest City Insurance Co. v.
Hardesty, 182 Ill. 39 (1889); German Insurance Co. v. Wright, 49
Pac. (Kan.) 704 (1897); Oldham's Trustee v. Boston Ins. Co., 189
Ky. 844 (1920).
6Wyman v. Wyman, 26 N .Y. 253 (1863).
73 Sim. 97, 57 Eng. Rep. 936 (1829).
sCulbertson v. Cox, 13 N. W. (Minn.) 177 (1882); Wyman v.
Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253 (1863); Clyburn v. Reynolds, 31 S. C. 91 (1889);
Graham v. Roberts, 43 N. C. 99 (1851); Dix v. German Ins. Co., 65
Mo. App. 34 (1896); Millard v. Beaumont, 185 S. W. (Mo.) 547
(1916); Haxall Executors v. Shippen, 10 Leigh (Va.) 536 (1839);
169
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follows: The testator insured certain property and died
leaving a widow who took a life estate with remainder
over. Subsequently the premises were burned and the ad-
ministrator collected the insurance money. The Court said,
"the proceeds of the policy partook of the character of
real estate and was affected with a trust for the benefit
of the parties interested in such real estate, and the plain-
tiff, as widow of the deceased, was entitled to the use of
the money during her life-the same interest she was en-
titled to in the property destroyed"-and gave her judg-
ment for a sum in gross equal to the present worth of the
life interest.
It seems to be well settled that a contract of fire in-
surance is strictly personal and does not pass as an incident
to a transfer of title to the property. 10 While this rule
might be applicable as against a grantee, mortgagee or
other creditor who claimed an interest in the proceeds by
virtue of a conveyance or lien upon the property which was
insured, it is apparently unavailable against a devisee. As
was said in Culbertson v. Cox," per Mitchell J., "We do not
think that the widow, heir or devisee, upon whom the
property devolves upon the death of the insured are strang-
ers to the contract of insurance. Neither are they and the
personal representative strangers to each other; for both
acquire their rights from the deceased by a devolution or
transfer, which is not forbidden by the policy. Both repre-
sent the insured; the title to the property, and the beneficial
interest in the policy, passing to the widow, heir or de-
visee; while the right of action to recover on the policy is
by its terms vested in the administrator or executor, while
the interest in the property which was requisite to sustain
the action, belongs to others."
It has been pointed out in this note, that in Pennsyl-
vania the vendor who recovers the proceeds of a fire insur-
Kane's Estate, 77 N. Y. Supp. 874 (1902); Reynold's Estate, 109 AtL
(Vt.) 60. See also 16 A.L.R. 312 and cases cited.
913 N. W. (Minn.) 177 (1882).
1OCulbertson v. Cox, 13 N. W. (Minn.) 177 (1882); Richards on
Insurance, page 76 and cases cited.
1113 N. W. (Minn.) 177 (1882).
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ance policy holds it as a trustee for the vendee.12 Conse-
quently, our courts in Pennsylvania have every reason to
hold that such proceeds when recovered by the personal
representative remain in his hands as a trustee for those
beneficially interested in the property.
Although this precise question has never been present-
ed to an appellate court in Pennsylvania, there is a lower
court decision, Callahan's Estate,13 in which it is said, "In-
surance money received by an executor for a loss of prop-
erty by fire has a double character. It belongs on the one
hand to the devisees of the property and on the other is
assets for the payment of debts, and it must be used so far
as needed for that purpose; but both of these qualities are
to be kept in mind in disposing of such fund. The executor
has the right to resort to it to make up the deficiency cast
upon him by the settlement of his administration account
but after that has been satisfied the balance must be de-
voted to the same trusts as the real estate out of which it
grew."
While unquestionably the insurance money is an asset
for the payment of the testator's debts, it is not to be
assumed that there has been such a conversion of the prop-
erty as to change the nature of the fund and make it dis-
tributable as a fund derived from a sale of personalty.
On the contrary, the proceeds of the insurance policy are
merely a substitute for the property destroyed and are
subject to the payment of debts only to the extent and in
the order that the property would have been were it not
destroyed."
The New York Court of Appeals in the leading case of
Wyman v. Wyman15 said, "An insurance policy provides that
upon destruction or injury of the property the insurers, if
they choose, might repair or restore it in specie. If they
'?See note 3.
185 Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 105.
1"O'Brein's Estate, 19 C. C. (Pa.) 467 (1897); Nichol's Appeal,
128 Pa. 428 (1889); Parry v. Ashley, 3 Sim. 97, 57 Eng. Rep. 936
(1829); Culbertson v. Cox 13 N. W. (Minn.) 177 (1882); 26 C. J. 593
and cases cited.
1526 N. Y. 253 (1863).
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had elected to that course the expenditure which would
have been made would of course have been entirely for the
benefit of the heirs. The building repaired or replaced
would have been theirs because standing upon their lands.
The theory of the payment of money in lieu of such rep-
aration is that the party is thus enabled to replace what
has been destroyed by himself instead of it being done by
the insurers. **** It would be a singular result if the
election of the insurers could determine whether the heirs
or administrator should take the benefits of their contract;
whether they would make compensation in money to the
latter or in kind to the former. And it is a strong implica-
tion from the existence of such a feature in the contract
that its benefits must in any event and in either perform-
ance enure to those who would, in case of literal perform-
ance reap its fruits. My opinion is that in such a case the
administrator or executor is trustee for the heirs who alone
have been damnified, who has sustained the loss and en-
titled to indemnity."
To epitomize:
1. Under the standard policy of fire insurance which
runs to the insured and "his legal representatives" it is
proper for the personal representative to maintain an action
to recover for a loss occuring after the death of the in-
sured.
2. However, the fiduciary holds the proceeds in a
double capacity. They belong on the one hand to the de-
visee of the property but if the personal estate is not suf-
ficient to pay the debts of the deceased, resort may be had
to the proceeds of the policy to the same extent as the
property would have been liable were it not destroyed by
fire.
3. But aside from this claim of creditors to which the
right of the devisee is subordinate, the proceeds should be
distributed among those entitled to the real estate.
Milton J. Goodman.
